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CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES:
RECONCILING OFFICIAL IMMUNITY WITH
THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS
MICHAEL L. WELLS'

A great deal of scholarly attention is devoted to
constitutional rights and comparatively little to remedies for
their violation. Yet rights without remedies are not worth much,
and remedial law does not always facilitate the enforcement of
rights, even of constitutional rights. This Article discusses an
especially challenging remedial context: suits seeking damages
for constitutional wrongs that occurred in the past, that are
unlikely to recur, and hence that cannot be remedied by forwardlooking injunctive or declaratory relief. Typical fact patterns
include charges that the police, prison guards, school
administrators, or other officials have engaged in illegal searches
and seizures, or fired people on account of protected speech, or
deprived them of liberty or property without due process of law,
or discriminated against them in violation of equal protection.
Because these backward-looking suits bear some resemblance to
ordinary tort law, the doctrine is often called "constitutional
tort." Plaintiffs sue state and local officers and municipal
governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 and federal officers under
the implied cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics.2
The problem addressed in this Article is that, in practice,
this retrospective remedy is often illusory. Even if the plaintiff
can win on the merits of the constitutional claim, the "official
immunity" doctrine blocks many suits for damages against state
t Professor, University of Georgia Law School. The author thanks Elizabeth
Burch, Dan Coenen, Tom Eaton, and John Jeffries for helpful comments on a draft of
this Article.
1 The statute provides, "Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any ... person ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
2 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
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and federal officers.
For example, in Lane v. Franks,3 a
government employee had been fired by a supervisor for truthful
testimony in response to a subpoena.4 He sued under § 1983,
charging a violation of his First Amendment rights.'
He
prevailed on the merits of the free speech claim, but lost anyway,
as the Court upheld the supervisor's qualified immunity defense.'
The policy behind immunity is that, without it, officials
would hesitate to act in the public interest for fear of personal
liability.7 The defense has two parts. First, officials engaged in
judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions are absolutely
immune from liability for damages, no matter how egregious
their conduct. 8 Second, other officers are shielded from liability
unless they have violated "clearly established"9 constitutional
rights. For a sense of what this abstract principle means in
practice, consider Coffin v. Brandau.1 ° A police officer entered
the plaintiffs garage, which was attached to his house, in order
to serve a court order.1" But, the officer had not obtained a
warrant authorizing the entry. 2
The black letter Fourth
Amendment rule in force at the time prohibited police officers
1 3
from entering a house to serve a court order without a warrant.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled en banc that the entry violated the
Fourth Amendment, but it also held that the prior law on
entering the house did not "clearly establish" that entering the
attached garage would violate the Fourth Amendment and thus
upheld the defendant's official immunity defense. 4

3 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).

4 Id. at 2376.
5 Id.
Id. at 2383.
' See Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4-5 (2013) (per curiam); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
' See SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 399 (LexisNexis 3d
ed. 2010).
6

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
10 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011) (en bane).

11 Id. at 1004-05.
12
13

Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1010.

14 Id.

at

1014,

1017; see also Karen

Blum et

al.,

Qualified Immunity

Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 653-54
(2013). "Hope" is a punning reference to Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), a

plaintiff-friendly immunity case that seems to have been forgotten in recent rulings.
Id. at 654.
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This Article examines a well-settled and routine-but
destructive and quite unnecessary-consequence of the interplay
between the liability rule and the official immunity doctrine.
Consider two plaintiffs, Alice and Bob, each of whom sues for
damages under § 1983. Suppose that both plaintiffs lose, but for
different reasons.
Alice establishes a violation of her
constitutional rights, but fails because the defendant successfully
asserts official immunity. Bob cannot show that his rights were
violated in the first place. Despite the difference between their
cases, current Supreme Court doctrine directs that Alice and Bob
be treated the same. Both go away empty-handed.15 Under the
Court's approach, the competing goals behind liability and
immunity are balanced in the following way: On the one hand,
the aim of constitutional tort law is to compensate the plaintiff
and to deter violations of rights.16 But on the other side of the
balance, official immunity carries enough weight to override the
compensation and deterrence goals.
Thus, the official's
successful immunity defense carries the same force as a
successful defense on the merits. Both result in total victory for
the defense.
In this Article, I argue for a different conception of
constitutional tort law, in which it is recognized that Alice's case
differs fundamentally from Bob's. The point is not to question
official immunity, a doctrine that has broad support from the
Supreme Court. My project is to reconcile official immunity with
Alice's legitimate claim for a remedy. I seek to justify an
outcome in Alice's case that provides her with some form of
redress, even though compensatory damages are precluded by
immunity. The premise of my argument is that tort theory is a
valuable resource for understanding, evaluating, and improving
" See RICHARD

H.

FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 995 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that a successful
immunity defense leads to dismissal).
1
See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625 (2012) (explaining that an implied

remedy under the Eighth Amendment is not available to an inmate in a private
prison because state tort law provides "roughly similar incentives... [and] roughly
similar compensation" to the proposed constitutional remedy); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978) (stating that the "basic purpose" of recovery of damages for

constitutional violations is "to compensate persons for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights," id. at 254, and another purpose is to "deter the
deprivation of constitutional rights," id. at 256). Later, the Court said that
deterrence "operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory."
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986).
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the law on suits for damages for constitutional violations. The
core principle guiding this approach, taken from the "civil
recourse" theory of tort law, is that "what a tort cause of action
provides is not an opportunity to hurt the wrongdoer," but "a
right to demand that the wrongdoer be held accountable.1 7
Public law experts may resist the application of tort theory to a
constitutional problem. I hope that the argument will have
enough force to win them over.
The gist of the argument is that the Court errs when it
treats compensation as an ultimate goal of the litigation. Its
mistake lies in confusing means with ends. In tort law, including
constitutional tort, compensation is a tool for achieving goals, not
an end in itself. In both constitutional tort and ordinary tort, one
of the goals is deterrence.
But the Court has failed to
understand, recognize, or appreciate another goal-one that is
quite distinct from the compensatory means often used to achieve
it. This goal is vindication of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
In its constitutional tort cases, the Court has jumbled together
two distinct concepts, treating compensation and vindication not
as means and end but as more or less the same thing. Worse, it
often treats compensation as the sole measure of vindication. In
Carey v. Piphus,8 the leading case on constitutional tort
damages, the Court set forth "the compensation principle," which
is that damages in constitutional tort cases are designed to
provide "compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by
defendant's breach of duty."1 9 In stressing compensation, the
Court has overlooked the linchpin point that "constitutional
guarantees have an important intrinsic dimension entirely apart
from the injuries to person or property that may or may not
accompany their violation."20
My thesis is this: Even though the well-entrenched official
immunity defense defeats Alice's claim for compensatory
damages, she has a compelling case for vindication of her rights.
Even though compensation is precluded, some form of vindication
should be available, in the form of nominal damages-typically
17 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective

Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 322 (2011) (emphasis added).
i 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
19 Carey, 435 U.S. at 255 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Minneci,

132 S.Ct. at 624-25 (stressing the compensation goal).
20

Note, DamageAwards for ConstitutionalTorts: A ReconsiderationAfter Carey

v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966,978 (1980).
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$1. The instinctive reaction to this proposal is that it is pointless
because nominal damages are worth little to the plaintiff. While
the objection is not without force, five features of the
constitutional context blunt its impact. First, unless and until
the Court rethinks official immunity or other basic principles of
constitutional tort doctrine, there is no chance the plaintiff will
do any better. Second, the Court's requirement that the plaintiff
prove compensatory damages means that few plaintiffs recover
very large damages in any event. Third, state tort law may
authorize recovery of substantial damages, though the rules will
vary from state to state. Fourth, it is possible that a significant
number of plaintiffs sue primarily for the sake of obtaining
judicial recognition of their rights. They may be, more or less,
satisfied with a victory on the merits. In fact, a crucial corollary
of the vindication-oriented approach is that compensation is not
sufficient for vindication. Thus, the availability of an ordinary
tort remedy, which provides compensation but no opportunity to
establish the constitutional violation, is not an adequate
substitute for a constitutional tort suit. 21 Fifth, the victorious
plaintiff may be able to obtain attorney fees. As we will see,
however, the case law is divided on this issue.
Part I makes the crucial point that compensation is a tool
and not a distinct goal of tort liability. With civil recourse theory
as a guidepost, Part II argues that one of the aims of
constitutional tort law is vindication of the plaintiffs rights.
Civil recourse principles teach that vindication may be at least
partly achieved even when immunity blocks compensation. Part
III shows how the Court's failure to distinguish vindication from
compensation has unnecessarily impeded the vindication of
rights.
Two important official immunity cases-Camreta v.
22
Greene and Pearson v. Callahan23 -illustrate the missed
opportunities and show how they can be rectified. Part IV
explains why courts should award nominal damages and
attorney fees to plaintiffs who prevail on the constitutional
merits even when defendants escape liability on account of
official immunity. Part V expands the analysis beyond the
official immunity context.
It discusses implications of the
vindication-oriented approach for the Bivens cause of action
21
22
23

See infra Part V.
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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against federal officers for constitutional violations.
It also
argues that a vindication-centered theory of constitutional torts
casts doubt on some of the Court's rulings in § 1983 cases.
I.

COMPENSATION IN TORT LAW: A MEANS, NOT AN END

The "compensation principle" is a common locution in
summary discussions of the purposes of tort liability.2 4
Nonetheless, this way of speaking is actually a somewhat
misleading shorthand for a more complex proposition-that there
are good reasons for obliging the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff in a given case.25 Tort law consists largely in identifying
those good reasons and debating which rationales should make
the list. These reasons may include deterring socially harmful
conduct, requiring a blameworthy person to redress the harm,
obliging the person who is ultimately responsible for harm to pay
for it, spreading losses across a large number of people, and
perhaps others. Choosing among these goals is a lively topic in
tort theory. For the purpose of separating means from ends,
however, it does not matter how they are ranked, only that the
award must in principle achieve one or more of them. Otherwise,
liability cannot be justified. The problem is that, absent one of
these good reasons, compensation is only a transfer from one
person to another, which produces no net benefit.26 Declaring
24

See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW

21 (4th ed. 2012) ("It is sometimes said that a function of tort law is to promote the
compensation of those who have suffered injury."); SHUBHA GHOSH, ACING TORT
LAW 6 (A. Benjamin Spencer ed., 2d ed. 2012) ("Two policies underlie tort law:
compensation of injured parties and deterrence of harmful conduct.").
2'
For example, Professor Dobbs's treatise begins the discussion of tort law's
aims by observing that "[t]he most commonly mentioned aims of tort law are
(1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of undesirable behavior." 1
DAN B. DOBBS ET. AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 18 (Thomson Reuters 2d ed. 2011). In the
very next sentence Dobbs then points out that "[b] oth of these aims, however, are
subsumed in whole or part under even broader goals." Id. The ensuing paragraphs
discuss such goals as "[m]orality or corrective justice," "[s]ocial utility or public
policy," and "[p]rocess," and then recognize "[p]otential conflicts" among goals. Id. at
18-19; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 24, at 16-17 (similar). Professor Abraham
points out that "[t]he desirability of providing compensation to a particular class of
injury victims rarely explains the lines that are drawn to distinguish those who are
and those who are not entitled to prevail in a tort claim. Rather, time after time,
some other factor or factors explain the occasion for the imposition of tort liability, or
tort law's refusal to impose liability." Id. at 21.
26 See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 24, at 21-22; Kenneth W. Simons, The
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER
L.J. 719, 726 (2008).
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that compensation is the goal while neglecting the crucial
qualifier that there must be a good reason for the transfer is to
misunderstand tort law's true "compensation principle."
Conceiving of compensation as the ultimate goal of tort is to
confuse means with ends, and causes with effects.2 7
Rather than an end in itself, compensation is a tool for
achieving several possible goals. 28 The Court recognized this in
Carey v. Piphus. 29 There, the Court said that one of the aims of
damages is deterrence.
The means and end relation between
compensation and deterrence is straightforward, as is the
categorical difference between the two.3 1 But on another crucial
point, Carey took a misstep that has distorted constitutional tort
doctrine ever since. It said that "the basic purpose" of § 1983
damages is "to compensate persons for injuries caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights. 32 But compensation is not a
goal, or a "purpose," as Carey put it. Compensation is a means.
In tort law, compensation may serve either of two other broad
goals besides deterrence. A second broad rationale for tort
liability is fairness, or "corrective justice" between the parties. A
third is diminishing the "disutility" caused by an injury, by
liability rules that spread losses or place liability on a "deep
pocket." The aim here is to put the burden of paying claims on
institutions and businesses that can and do insure against them
or can easily cover them. With regard to both the fairness and
"diminishing disutility" goals, the seeming convergence between

27 Simons, supra note 26; see also SAUL LEVMORE & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY,

FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 1 (Found. Press 2d ed. 2009) ("The goals of tort law are

often articulated as compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice. Yet, the
academic discussion of tort law in the United States focuses primarily on deterrence
and corrective justice, largely because both of these theoretical approaches seek to
explain why tort law renders compensation to injured parties.").
2' These goals are discussed in Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 57, 57-78 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); see
also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 844 (10th ed. 2012); MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 42-44

(2008).
29

435 U.S. 247 (1978).

o Id. at 256-57.
31 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (stating

that

deterrence

"operates

compensatory").
32 Carey, 435 U.S. at 254.

through

the mechanism

of damages

that

are
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compensation as a means and compensation as the ultimate goal
is misleading. The goal is actually some moral or utilitarian end
that is served by compensation.
Showing why requires a brief foray into tort theory, but one
that will drive home the crucial point that "compensation" is
always a means, never an end. Taking fairness first, ordinary
tort law is mainly concerned with identifying the circumstances
in which defendants must pay plaintiffs for physical and
emotional injuries. These triggers are breaches of duties owed by
defendants to plaintiffs. The relevant circumstance may be that
the defendant has intentionally touched, threatened, or
imprisoned the plaintiff,33 or that the defendant has caused
harm,3 4 or that the defendant has negligently caused harm, 5 or
that the defendant caused harm by an abnormally dangerous
activity, 3 or that the defendant caused harm by manufacturing a
defective product,3 7 or that the defendant owed some affirmative
duty to help the plaintiff and did not follow through. 38 As a
result of the breach, the plaintiff has been hurt, misses time from
work, incurs medical bills, suffers from pain or trauma, and now
seeks to be made whole or to obtain redress for harms that
cannot be fully cured by money.
The award-that is, the
compensation-more or less accomplishes these goals. But it is
nonetheless a mistake to conceive of compensation as the goal.
The rationale for obliging the defendant to pay is not
"compensation." Rather, the justification for the award-and
thus the goal served by compensation-is that the plaintiff has a
right to redress for the breach of duty that triggers liability. No

" Materials on these and other intentional torts are collected in EPSTEIN &
SHARKEY, supra note 28, at 3-75.
"4 Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Wis. 1996)
(declaring, in the context of holding an insane person liable, "that where a loss must
be borne by one of two innocent persons, it shall be borne by him who occasioned
it .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF
STRICT LIABILITY 15-49 (1980).
" Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (adopting negligence as a general
requirement for liability).
36 See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 18, 250 N.E.2d 31, 35, 302
N.Y.S.2d 527, 532 (1969).
" See, e.g., Speller ex rel. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 100 N.Y.2d 38, 41, 790
N.E.2d 252, 254, 760 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342-43 (Cal.
1976).
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one is liable absent such a breach. In other words, no one is
liable simply because a plaintiff seeks compensation from that
person.9
As for loss spreading, compensation is certainly an essential
tool. But the goal is to diminish the "disutility," which is merely
the opposite of "utility," that is generated by the loss.40 This is
ordinarily accomplished by distributing the loss over a large
number of people rather than having it fall entirely on the
injured person." In this way, the psychological impact of the
harm, the "disutility," is minimized, on account of a principle
called the increasing marginal disutility of loss.4 2 This principle
holds that as a monetary loss increases, the amount of well-being
that is lost-"disutility"-goes up disproportionately to the
amount of money that is lost. Thus, a loss of $100 may produce
more disutility to one person than it would if one thousand
people each paid ten cents into a fund to compensate the injured
person.43 Putting aside the vocabulary of welfare economics, and
stating the point in commonsense terms: The loss would be a
crushing blow if the victim were left to absorb all of it. That loss
is diminished when it is spread because each of those who pays a
tiny fraction of it suffers a minuscule loss. Even when all of
those losses are added together, they amount to less than the
crushing blow that the uncompensated victim would suffer. Even
without spreading, the "diminishing disutility" goal may be
satisfied, at least in theory, by identifying a defendant with a
"deep pocket," who has plenty of money. Such a defendant may
be so well off that even $100 out of his deep pocket will cause him
less disutility than the injured plaintiff would suffer if no
payment were made.4 4 In practice, however, "loss spreading" and
the "deep pocket" theme tend to converge, as most defendants
with deep pockets are businesses who are able to spread losses by

"SSee CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 8 (2d ed.
1980) ("The fact that the plaintiff has suffered a loss is no reason, in and of itself, for
taking money from the defendant.").
40 See, e.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 28.
41
42

Id.
Id.

41 See, e.g., id. at 42-43 (discussing "[c]ompensation of [i]njuries" by spreading

losses).
44 See Perry, supra note 28, at 68.
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raising prices. The central point is that, under any version of the
"diminishing disutility" rationale, compensation is a means
rather than an end.45
11.

VINDICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

46
From Carey, decided in 1978, through Minneci v. Pollard,
decided in 2012, the Court has asserted that compensation and
deterrence are the aims of constitutional tort law.47 Scholars
have followed the Court's lead without noticing the latent
ambiguity of the "compensation" goal. 4 Ever since Carey, the
Court has ignored the distinction between means and ends and
has treated compensation as a surrogate for vindication.4 9
Having neglected to separate vindication from compensation, the
Court has been content to borrow "principles derived from the
common law of torts,5 0 without making much of an effort to
adapt those principles to the constitutional tort context. As a
result, it has not generated case law on the nature and purposes
of vindication in constitutional torts. For example, it has not
addressed such basic questions as why the plaintiffs
constitutional
rights
should
be
vindicated,
in what
circumstances, and by what means. Scholarly commentary,
though critical of the Court's constitutional tort doctrine in many
respects, has followed the Court's lead on this issue.
If vindication is to receive its due in constitutional tort
adjudication, it needs a more robust defense than it has received.
This Part of the Article argues that the civil recourse theory of
general tort law furnishes guidance for understanding and
implementing the value of vindication in constitutional torts.
Starting from civil recourse principles, the task is to devise rules
that reconcile the value of vindication with the policies that
underlie the defense of official immunity. I undertake that
project in Parts III, IV, and V.

" In this Article, I set aside the "diminishing disutility" goal, which may have
little relevance to constitutional torts, in order to focus on the value of vindication.
46 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
41 Id. at 620, 623-26 (rejecting a Bivens cause of action because state tort law
provided sufficient compensation and deterrence); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254 (1978) (stating that basic purpose of§ 1983 is compensation).
41 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 486 & nn.36-37 (2011).
41 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-59 (1978).
" Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986).
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Civil Recourse for ConstitutionalTorts

Because of Carey's failure to distinguish vindication from
compensation, the Court has not clearly articulated the value of
vindication. By equating vindication with compensation, the
Court has dodged basic issues regarding vindication in
constitutional torts: What is the point of "vindication"? Is it a
viable non-deterrent rationale for imposing constitutional tort
liability?
Is vindication distinct from "making the plaintiff
whole" by compensating the plaintiff, and in what way? On the
premise that compensation is not available, can vindication be
achieved by other means, and if so, how? Because the Court
conflates vindication and compensation and focuses mainly on
the latter, the opinions contain no sustained examination of these
questions about the distinct value of vindication. There are no
cases explaining what vindication is, why it is valuable, what it
requires, and the circumstances in which it should control the
outcome of litigation.
General tort law has always been a rich source of insights for
constitutional tort. So it is with vindication. This Section
borrows from civil recourse theory, a relatively recent approach
to general tort law that enjoys growing acceptance. My aim is to
build a case for vindication and to lay a foundation for answering
some of the questions the Court's opinions do not address in
anything better than the most fragmentary way.
1.

Civil Recourse Theory

The Court has always adjudicated constitutional tort issues
"against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." 1 As a
result, it has looked to tort law for governing doctrines, such as
the "compensation principle" of Carey and the official immunity
limit recognized in cases running from Tenney v. Brandhove12 to
Rehberg v. Paulk 3 But the Court has also done something more:
It has looked to tort law to identify overarching purposes on
which the doctrines of constitutional tort law should be built. 4
1 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section
1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 157, 166-75 (1998).
52 341 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1951) (legislative immunity).
53 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503-04 (2012) (grand jury witness immunity).
51 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-57 (1980).
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In Owen v. Independence," for example, the Court invoked the
values of compensation, deterrence, and loss spreading in holding
that local governments may not assert immunity from suit."
And the deterrence goal is merely the constitutional version of
the policy, long entrenched in ordinary tort law, that liability
rules do and should create incentives to engage in socially
beneficial behavior and to refrain from socially destructive
conduct. 7
"Civil recourse," an approach to general tort law developed
over the past fifteen years, provides a basis for conceiving of the
plaintiffs case for constitutional tort mainly as an effort to
vindicate personal rights." Civil recourse theory conceives of tort
law as organized society's alternative to private violence for
wrongful injuries. 9 In the absence of the state, we would be
entitled to exact retribution against those who have wronged
us. 60
In a civilized society, self-help of this kind must be
forbidden.6 1 For the sake of social peace, government suppresses
most private violence. 6 ' Having eliminated blood feuds and other
forms of vengeance, the state takes on an obligation to provide an
alternative means for holding the defendant accountable for the
wrong. 3 Wholly apart from deterrence, there is a "distinctive
normative goal that is vindicated by giving citizens the ability to
proceed in court against those that have wronged them. 6 4
Conversely, the defendant is accorded an opportunity to contest
the plaintiffs charge and obtain judicial validation of his or her
conduct. 5

5

445 U.S. 622 (1980).

516

Id. at 651-57.

57

See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 24, at 18-19; GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at

43-44.
51

See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.

REV. 917, 939 (2010) (giving a detailed account of civil recourse theory). See
generally Symposium: Civil Recourse Theory, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2011)

(discussing a variety of perspectives on civil recourse).
5

See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 58, at 973.

60 See id. at 972-73.
61 See id. at 973.
62 Id. at 982.
63

Id.

64

Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 40

(2011).
65

See id. at 64.
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Civil recourse theorists, notably Professors John Goldberg
and Benjamin Zipursky, claim that "we are entitled to a private
right of action in place of getting even."66 Professor Goldberg
reasons that "[g] overnment, by taking on the task of maintaining
civil society, obtains from individuals a variety of powers that
they would otherwise be entitled to exercise." 7 Goldberg and
Zipursky argue that we "relinquish[] the raw liberty to respond
aggressively to having been wronged and receive[] in return a
certain level of security ... , plus the assurance that a civil
avenue of redress against wrongdoers will be supplied."8 In
making the case that civil recourse is an attractive norm, Jason
Solomon adds that "'acting against' another in response to
wrong-doing is a distinctive form of 'moral address,' and one
which is particularly salient in a society based on liberal
individualism." 9 While this approach to tort law was initially
developed in the common law context, its reasoning applies fully
to constitutional torts as well. Thus, "according to civil recourse
theory, a government's responsibility to enact a law of civil
recourse is a responsibility to apply that law not only to private
citizens, but also to its officials."7
On the remedial side of the tort case, Professor Goldberg
distinguishes between two approaches-"full" compensation and
"fair" compensation.7 1 In "standard modern" tort law, the avowed
point of damages is to make the plaintiff whole.72 In this view,
tort law is "a means by which a person who suffers a harm can

6

Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51

VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
67 John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 606 (2005).
6" Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 58, at 974. But, the extent

to which tort law empowers the plaintiff should not be overstated. Ori J. Herstein is
no doubt right in arguing that, at the end of the day, the "legal power to alter
tortfeasors' legal rights and relations" still belongs to the state. Ori J. Herstein, How
Tort Law Empowers, 65 TORONTO L.J. 99 (forthcoming 2015).
69 Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L.

REV. 1765, 1785 (2009). Professor Solomon adds that "a legal system that provides a
state-created mechanism for individuals to obtain redress of wrongs is itself
normatively attractive and politically justified." Id. at 1798.
" John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law at the Founding, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 88
(2011).
71 John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 437-38 (2006).
72

Id. at 436.
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have that harm annulled, erased, or indemnified.7 3 In civil
74
recourse, the overall aim is to hold the defendant accountable.
7
Damages provide "redress" from the wrongdoer to the victim.
Assessing them "requires of the fact-finder an overtly normative
determination based on consideration not only of the losses
suffered by the victim, but also of the character of the defendant's
conduct. 7 6 Applying this principle to constitutional torts, we
shall see that there may be good reasons to disallow
compensatory damages, notably when the defendant meets the
requirements for official immunity, while nonetheless providing
the plaintiff with recourse for constitutional violations, if only by
means of nominal damages.
2.

Recourse for Constitutional Violations
Applying civil recourse principles to constitutional tort law
does not oblige us to endorse every tenet of the theory.
Notwithstanding the descriptive and interpretive claims of civil
recourse theorists, for example, vindication-as opposed to
deterrence and loss spreading-may not be a paramount value in
ordinary tort law.77 But, that issue does not concern us here.
Whatever the merit of Goldberg and Zipursky's global theory of
torts, the civil recourse norm-that the state should provide
access to the courts for the vindication of rights-is especially
strong in the constitutional tort context. In this area, the rights
for which recourse is sought are, by their nature, core features of
our system of government. Unlike common law tort rights, they
cannot be erased or modified as the legislature sees fit. The
general purpose of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, where most of those rights are located, is to
safeguard individual liberty and equality against abuses of power

73
7'
7'

Id.

71

Id. at 437.

Goldberg, Tort Law at the Founding,supra note 70, at 86-87.
Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation,
supra note 71, at 439-40.
For a skeptical view of the interpretive claims made by civil recourse
theorists, see Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227,
236-41 (2011); see also id. at 228 & n.3 (discussing economics-oriented approaches).
Mark Geistfeld argues that "[w]ith the development of liability insurance in the
twentieth century, tort liability began to function [as a form of loss sharing] with
increased regularity." GEISTFELD, supra note 28, at 43.
77
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by officials.78 Those officials-the defendants from whom relief is
sought-differ from most other tort defendants in that they
possess the power of the state, with its near-monopoly on the
legitimate use of force.
Since the rights asserted in
constitutional tort serve more fundamental values than ordinary
tort rights, and since especially powerful constitutional tort
defendants pose a greater threat to our rights than most other
tort defendants, the plaintiffs interest in civil recourse for
violations of these rights by these defendants is considerably
enhanced. It follows that the case for obliging the state to
provide recourse for constitutional tort is, if anything, more
powerful than for other torts.
Most plaintiffs in any type of tort litigation would welcome a
large monetary recovery. But, the plaintiffs paramount interest
in recourse is a conspicuous feature of many constitutional tort
suits. The limits on recovery enforced by official immunity
doctrine and the damages rules from Carey and Stachura suggest
that many, and perhaps most, constitutional tort plaintiffs are
not motivated by a large award.7 9 These plaintiffs probably
conceive of their lawsuits mainly as efforts to obtain judicial
validation of their claims, with the hope of monetary recovery as
a distinctly secondary motivation.
Constitutional tort cases
typically arise out of disagreeable encounters with government
officers, whether with the police, with prison and school
authorities, or with supervisors in government offices.8 0 The
officer, often armed and always in a position of power, humiliates
the plaintiff by hitting, handcuffing, or firing the plaintiff for
something the plaintiff said. 1 The plaintiff is not only injured,
but also outraged by abusive treatment and seeks to hold the
officer accountable. 2 Despite the fact-intensive legal issues these
7 See Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: JudicialActivism and
PopularResponse, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2061, 2099 (2013).
" See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-08 (1986);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 259 (1978). See generally J. LEE & BARRY

LINDAHL, 2 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION

§

17:1 (Clark Boardman

Callaghan ed., 2d ed. 1990).
" See Bishop v. Glazier, 723 F.3d 957, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2013) (snowstorm
assistance on highway by a deputy officer allegedly led to excessive force).
"1See Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2011) (officer forced
innocent, non-threatening, handcuffed 15-year-old girl to the ground while executing
warrant).
82 These unpleasant, humiliating, and sometimes harrowing encounters with
the police occur in a variety of contexts. Illustrative cases include Bishop, 723 F.3d
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cases usually present, 3 and the ensuing risk of losing on account
of official immunity,84 plaintiffs persist in bringing them. It
appears that the desire to have one's day in court against officers
and governments is strong enough to overcome the obstacles to
recovery and the meager monetary rewards of victory. A realistic
assessment of this type of litigation is that plaintiffs come to
court to seek vindication of their rights. And their felt need to do
so suggests that our courts should attend to the value of fostering
such vindication as they frame the law of constitutional tort.85
B.

Official Immunity

Uncompromising fidelity to the value of vindication would
require the imposition of liability whenever the plaintiff could
establish a violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Yet
at 959-60 (snowstorm assistance allegedly led to excessive force); Poole v. City of
Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2012) (traffic stop); Khan v. Normand, 683
F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 2012) (deadly force used against mentally ill man); Phillips v.
Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2012) (traffic stop); Morris v. Noe, 672
F.3d 1185, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2012) (arrest for domestic dispute); Montoya v. City of
Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 869-70 (8th Cir. 2012) (arrest for domestic dispute); Glenn
v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2011) (police shooting of
intoxicated and distraught 18-year-old); Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d
1071, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (arrest for scalping tickets); Mlodzinski, 648 F.3d at
27 (officer forced innocent, non-threatening, handcuffed 15-year-old girl to the
ground while executing warrant); Huckaby v. Priest, 636 F.3d 211, 213-14 (6th Cir.
2011) (police mistakenly thought homeowners were burglars); Frizzell v. Szabo, 647
F.3d 698, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2011) (traffic stop).
s See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-96 (1989).
s4See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (explaining that
excessive force claims turn "very much on the facts of each case"); see also John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for ConstitutionalTorts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 266-68
(2013).
" The civil recourse value of providing the plaintiff with access to the courts to
demand accountability is noted by Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble
with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 71-74 (2010) (discussing some of the
"collateral benefits" of tort litigation, which include, for example, "empower[ing]
people to demand answers from those they believe injured them," id. at 72, and the
"value in public conversations about what we owe one another," id. at 74). For an
argument that the suing for "vindication of insulted honor" is a "morally valuable
activity," see Oman, supra note 64, at 32. Writing of civil recourse in general tort
law, Oman asserts that the plaintiffs agency-that is, his role in initiating and
pursuing the litigation-is a key component of its value. Id. at 56. Moreover, "[t]he
claims of [wronged] honor are strongest in the case of intentional torts," especially
those that "arise out of situations in which the tortfeasor has deliberately treated
the victim as an object that he can harm with impunity." Id. at 64. Many
constitutional tort plaintiffs probably (rightly or wrongly) think of their cases in this
way, even though they also seek significant monetary relief. The money may serve
as a tangible measure of the wrong to the plaintiffs honor.
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the rules governing recovery are actually quite restrictive."6
Liability is often denied, and vindication is blocked, even when
the plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation."
The main
reason is the official immunity defense, much of which was given
its current form in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.88 Official immunity is
the Court's response to "the implicit asymmetry in the incentives
faced by public officials when left wholly unprotected by any
immunity doctrine."8 9 Unlike private businesses, officials do not
reap most of the benefits of their actions." If they were liable for
all of their constitutional violations, they would tend to be too
cautious. 1 The police may fail to arrest a suspect who has
committed crimes and will commit more of them, or a supervisor
may fail to dismiss a destructive subordinate, or a prosecutor
may fail to bring charges. On account of these efforts at selfprotection, society as a whole will bear an unacceptably high cost
for the deterrence of constitutional violations. 2
With these concerns in mind, the Court draws a distinction
between two types of immunity. Officers engaged in judicial,
prosecutorial, or legislative functions may assert absolute
immunity from damages. 3 Other officials may assert "qualified"
immunity. 4
Before Harlow, an official could lose qualified
immunity for either of two reasons: (1) if he should have known
that he was violating constitutional rights, which is an objective
test, or (2) if he acted with bad faith or malice, which is a
subjective test.9" Sensitive to what Harlow called "the need to
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-07 (1982).
s See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (refusing to hold

government vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by their
employees).

88 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Other obstacles include the rule that state governments
may not be sued under § 1983, see generally Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58 (1989), and the rule that local governments are not vicariously liable in suits
for damages for constitutional violations committed by their employees, see Monell,

436 U.S. at 691.
s9 EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 28, at 1341.
9' Id. at 1341-42.
91 Id. at 1341.
92 See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982); see also Jeffries, supra note 84, at 244-46 & nn.133-39.

Note, however, that officials may be indemnified by their governmental employers.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 15, at 996-97.
" The doctrine is summarized in Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012).
'4 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
" See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
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protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and
the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority, 9 6 the Court abandoned the subjective prong of
the test. Harlow shielded officers engaged in executive or
administrative functions from liability unless they violate
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. 9 7 In practice, this may
mean that an officer is not protected from liability when he fails
to infer that a rule requiring a warrant to enter a living room
also applies to an attached garage.98
Immunity is wellentrenched as a core principle of constitutional tort law. 99 Any
effort to clarify and enhance the role of vindication in
constitutional torts must give due regard to this defense and to
the important countervailing values it implements. Immunity
will always impede the full vindication of constitutional rights,
just because it blocks compensation. An important theme of this
Article, however, is that the unavailability of compensation need
not stand in the way of other measures that provide some
vindication for victims of constitutional violations.

III. HOW THE COURT'S "ALL-OR-NOTHING" APPROACH
UNDERVALUES VINDICATION

If constitutional tort is to remain a viable remedy for
anything other than egregious violations, a way must be found to
satisfy both the plaintiffs legitimate demand for vindication and
the state's interest in shielding officers from liability. The key
step in reaching a compromise is to recognize that the Court's
conflation of compensation and vindication is gratuitous, and is
indeed the root of a major obstacle to compromise.
As a
consequence of confusing means with ends, the Court has
misunderstood the conflict between the vindication goal and the
"avoiding unwanted deterrence" constraint, and has squandered
opportunities to devise suitable accommodations between the
two.10 0 Having neglected "vindication of rights" as a freestanding
goal, the Court reasons that deterrence is the sole noncompensatory aim of constitutional torts. Since immunity blocks
96 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted).

9 Id. at 818; see also Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
9S See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
...See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978).
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both compensation and deterrence, a successful immunity
defense leaves the plaintiff with no remedy at all. In fact, the
availability of an immunity defense may even deprive the
plaintiff not only of a remedy, but even of a ruling on the merits
of the plaintiffs constitutional claim. This Part of the Article
examines some untoward consequences of the Court's
overemphasis on compensation, using two illustrative cases:
Pearson v. Callahan"1 and Camreta v. Greene.1 12 These are cases
in which compensation is not an issue, yet vindication is an
achievable goal. For the Court, however, vindication is not a
factor.103 In the Court's view, once compensation is out of the
picture, the only task the cases present is resolving the tension
between the forward-looking goals of deterrence and avoiding
10 4
unwanted deterrence.
A.

The Pearson Case

Pearson concerned an issue Justice Breyer, the author of the
opinion, called the "order of battle."10 5 That expression refers to a
problem that arises in § 1983 and Bivens suits seeking damages
from officials. 0° In these cases the plaintiff must win on two
points in order to prevail. 0 o7
One is the substantive
constitutional issue; the other is official immunity, a defense
which casts a long shadow over many constitutional tort cases,
because it can block recovery no matter how strong the plaintiffs
case may be on the constitutional merits and no matter what
worthy aims may be served by liability.0 8
Since the plaintiff must prevail on both the merits and
immunity in order to win, a court convinced of the defendant's
immunity but uncertain of the underlying merits may prefer to
skip the merits and proceed directly to immunity. Each of the
two approaches-merits first or immunity first-has benefits and
corresponding costs. The main cost of deciding the merits first is

101 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
102

131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).

103 See id. at 2030-31; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
104 See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 240-41.
10' 555 U.S. at 234 (internal quotation mark omitted).
106

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
107 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
los Id. at 231.
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that doing so expends "scarce judicial resources"1 °9 on
constitutional issues that could be avoided. 1 0
Since the
defendant would ultimately prevail in any event, the benefits of
this procedure seem to come with no additional downside to the
plaintiff, beyond the disappointment of losing a case the plaintiff
would have lost anyway. Yet, the Court has struggled with the
order of battle. The cost of avoidance, according to the opinions
on the issue, is a systemic one-the elaboration of constitutional
doctrine may be stunted if courts opt for immunity rulings over
rulings on the merits.1
Thus, the benefits of reaching the
merits first include "the development of constitutional
precedent," defining constitutional rights, and limiting the future
availability of qualified immunity.1 2 Citing these benefits, the
Court in Saucier v. Katz11 3 had directed lower courts to address
the constitutional merits first, and only reach immunity upon
finding a violation. 1 4
Just eight years later, Pearson overruled Saucier in favor of
a case-by-case approach, in which the lower courts are "permitted
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand." ' The Court identified a number of circumstances that
may tip the scales in favor of deciding the immunity issue first,
such as "substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on
difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case,"
especially when "the constitutional question is so factbound that
the decision provides little guidance for future cases," or "when it
appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher court,"
or when the constitutional decision "rest[s] on an uncertain
interpretation of state law," or when "the precise factual basis for
the plaintiffs claim or claims may be hard to identify," or when
"the briefing
of constitutional
questions
is woefully

109

Id.

110 Id.

at 236-37.
at 241; see also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta

About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275-81 (2006).
...Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
112 Id.
113

533 U.S. 194 (2001).

114 See id. at 194.
115 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see, e.g., Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 910 (10th Cir.

2012).
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11
inadequate.""
Conversely, it would seem to follow that a ruling
on the merits should come first when guidance is a realistic aim,
as when the plaintiff seeks to invoke a clear and general rule.
From the perspective of vindication, however, this way of
approaching sequencing misses the main point of constitutional
tort law. Pearson focuses on guidance for the future, not
accountability for the past.1 7
Completely absent from the
Court's cost-benefit framework, and from its catalogue of
analytically relevant factors, is anything whatsoever that deals
with the value of vindicating constitutional rights.
Not
surprisingly, the root of the problem is the Court's confusion of
means with ends in Carey and the mistaken premise that
compensation and vindication are one and the same. The law in
this field rightly takes as a starting point that the defendant
wins on the immunity issue. Contrary to the view of the Court in
Pearson, however, that state of affairs does not take concerns
about vindication of rights off the table.
To be sure, if
compensation and vindication are two words for the same thing,
there can be no vindication of rights in a case where an immunity
defense precludes a compensatory recovery. If that were so, the
value of vindication would not figure in resolving the order-ofbattle issue.
But compensation and vindication are not the same thing.
In fact, in a civil recourse regime the vindication value is
undercut every time a court declines to reach the merits.1 The
organizing norm of such a regime, after all, is the plaintiffs
"natural,... legitimate, morally appropriate, and warranted" 1 9

entitlement to have the wrongdoer held accountable for the
wrong. 12 An opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits is a
threshold requirement for satisfying the plaintiffs legitimate
claim for recourse, whether or not he ultimately prevails.1 2 The
point is not that civil recourse principles must always control the
order of battle; it is only that these principles deserve
consideration as part of the matrix of factors that bear on
whether courts should decide the merits or the immunity issue
116 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-39.
117 Id. at 242.
us

See Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective Justice,

supra note 17, at 310.
119 Id. at 321.
121
121

See id. at 322.
Id. at 306.
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first. Despite the vindication-based rationale for an unbending
"merits first" rule, the Court rightly noted that other factors bear
on the question of whether to initially address the constitutional
merits.1 22
For example, concerns about efficient judicial
administration favor deciding the immunity issue first in some
cases. It makes sense to dispose of cases quickly on immunity
grounds when it is hard to determine the specifics of the
plaintiffs claim without extensive factual development, yet it is
clear that the putative right asserted by the plaintiff is not
clearly established, whatever its precise content might be. In
addition, the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
decisions may favor immunity-based dispositions of some cases,
especially when the issue is a controversial or novel one or the
merits ruling depends on resolving unsettled questions of state
law.
To say that policies of efficiency and constitutional
avoidance are worthy of attention, however, is not to say that
they are the only policies that count. The value of rights
vindication likewise should influence sequencing decisions.
B.

Mootness and Standing in Camreta

Camreta v. Greene 2 3 grew out of an investigation of Nimrod
Greene, a man suspected of sexual abuse of a child. 2 4 Greene
1 25
had a daughter, identified in the opinion by the initials "S.G.
Bob Camreta, a child protective services caseworker, and James
Alford, a deputy sheriff, went to the daughter's school and
interviewed her without first obtaining a warrant authorizing
them to do so. 1 26 S.G.'s mother, Sarah Greene, sued Camreta,
Alford, and other defendants on S.G.'s behalf, claiming a
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.1 27 On appeal from a
district court's grant of summary judgment to Camreta, the
Ninth Circuit panel made two rulings. 128 It first found that
Camreta, a state officer, violated S.G.'s Fourth Amendment

122

See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional

Torts, 2009 SuP. CT. REV. 115, 121-32 (2010).
123 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).

127

Id. at 2027.
Id.
Id.
Id.

12'

Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2009), vacated in part sub nom.

124
125
126

Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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rights in connection with the interview. 129 Second, it held that
the rights were not clearly established at the time so that the
defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.130 Camreta, who
had escaped liability because of the immunity ruling, sought
Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's application of the
Fourth Amendment.3
Before the Court could rule, another
significant event occurred: The plaintiff, who was about to turn
eighteen, moved out of the state. 3 2
The Supreme Court
ultimately addressed two issues: whether Camreta had standing
to raise the Fourth Amendment issue despite his victory in the
court below, and whether the plaintiffs move rendered the case
moot. 33
The Court held that Camreta had standing because he had
'
established an "injury in fact."134
How can a winner claim to
have suffered an injury? The Court began its answer to this
question by noting that even the "prevailing party below" may
have the necessary "personal stake" to justify a finding of
standing. 35 It continued:
This Article III standard often will be met when immunized
officials seek to challenge a ruling that their conduct violated
the Constitution. That is not because a court has made a
retrospective judgment about the lawfulness of the officials'
behavior, for that judgment is unaccompanied by any personal
liability.
Rather, it is because the judgment may have
prospective effect on the parties. 36
In particular, the official "must either change the way he
performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.1 37
The Court's reasoning here is explicitly and exclusively
forward-looking. As the Court framed the case, a key feature is
that official immunity precluded the plaintiff from obtaining
damages.1 3 The Court's explanation of the aim behind rulings on
129

Id. at 1030.

130 Id. at 1031-33.
131

Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027.

132 Id. at 2034.
133 Id. at 2026.
134 Id.
at 2028 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the "injury in fact"
requirement)).

131

Id. at 2029.

137

Id.
Id. (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 337-38 (1980)).

131

Id. at 2031.

136
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the merits echoes Pearson's deterrence-based grounds for
reaching the merits. 139 The "injury" has nothing to do with the
backward-looking ruling that Camreta violated the child's
rights.140
It exists solely "because the judgment may have
prospective effect on the parties." 4 ' Later in the opinion, the
Court drives this point home in the course of explaining why it
finds this case appropriate for its consideration, despite its
general refusal, "[a]s a matter of practice and prudence," to hear
cases at the request of a prevailing party. 42 Rulings on the
merits in immunity cases "have a significant future effect on the
conduct of public officials," and indeed are designed to do so, in
order "to promote clarity-and observance-of constitutional
rules.1 4 3
The alternative of routinely avoiding the merits
"threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in
limbo, 14' 4 and to "frustrate 'the development of constitutional
precedent' and the promotion of law-abiding behavior." 4 '
After holding that Camreta had standing to challenge the
lower court's Fourth Amendment ruling, the Court declined to
reach the merits because it deemed the case moot.14 As with the
treatment of Camreta's standing, the Court's reasoning here was
forward-looking.
Because the immunity ruling rendered
compensation unavailable, the Court simply assumed that the
past violation could not be vindicated. 4 7 Focusing solely on the
future, the Court ruled that the case had become moot because
S.G. had moved to Florida and was nearing her eighteenth
birthday, at which point she would no longer be subject to
investigations by Camreta or other child protection officers, even
if she returned to Oregon. 48 As a result, "she face[d] not the
slightest possibility of being seized in a school in the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction as part of a child abuse investigation."14' 9
She could "no longer claim the plaintiffs usual stake in
139 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
14 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2029.

223, 240-41 (2009).

143

Id.
Id. at 2030.
Id.

144

Id. at 2031 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5

141

142

(1998)).
141

Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)).
Id. at 2033.

147

Id. at 2034.

148

Id.

149

Id.

141
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preserving the court's holding because she no longer needs
1
protection from the challenged practice.""
For similar futureoriented reasons, the case was also moot as to Deputy Sheriff
Alford.15"
Because he "no longer work[ed] ... in law
enforcement"15 2 and "[would] not again participate in a child
abuse investigation, he ha[d] lost his interest in the Fourth
Amendment ruling." ' 3
1.

Mootness of the Plaintiffs Case

Decoupling vindication from compensation enables us to
examine the mootness and standing issues in Camreta from a
fresh perspective. A case is moot if the plaintiff no longer has
any stake in its outcome. 4 The Court reasoned that S.G. had no
backward-looking stake because of official immunity.1
From a
civil recourse perspective, the problem with this analysis is that,
once again, it conflates compensation with vindication. Camreta
is a case in which the plaintiff had sought civil recourse for the
encounter with Camreta and obtained a ruling that he violated
her daughter's Fourth Amendment rights. 5 That ruling, if it is
allowed to stand, is a form of vindication in itself, whether or not
any other relief is available. 7 In a meaningful sense, Camreta
has been held accountable, as civil recourse requires, and
certainly more so than he is when the case is simply dismissed.
The vindication value of that ruling does not vanish just because
the incident will not recur, or just because official immunity is an
insuperable barrier to obtaining damages, or because of both of
these factors taken together.
2.

The Defendants' Article III "Injury"

The Court's main holding in Camreta was that Camreta
could appeal to the Supreme Court despite his victory on
immunity in the Court of Appeals.15 8 From a vindication
...Id. at 2025.
11 Id. at 2034 n.9.
152

Id.

153 Id. (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)).

151

Id. at 2034.
Id.
Id. at 2026.

157

For an argument that nominal damages should be awarded in such a case,

154
155

see Part IV.
151 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2026.
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perspective, this holding is correct, but the Court's reasons are
incomplete. In the eyes of the Court, the "injury" giving Camreta
standing to pursue an appeal was that his future conduct may be
affected by the ruling against him on the merits of the Fourth
Amendment issue.1" 9 But under a civil recourse approach, the
issue whether the defendant has shown an Article III "injury"
does not depend solely on the future impact of the ruling on the
merits." 0 A corollary of treating the lower court's Fourth
Amendment ruling as a vindication of S.G.'s rights, without
regard to any future threat to her, is that the ruling is also a
condemnation of the officer's conduct, without regard to any
future consequences for him. Just as civil recourse empowers the
plaintiff to seek to hold the supposed wrongdoer accountable, so
also it provides the defendant an opportunity to show that he is
in fact not a wrongdoer.16 1 Camreta's interest in overturning the
lower court's ruling is the mirror image of the plaintiffs interest
in upholding it. His Article III "injury" is the lower court's ruling
that he violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.
Two other aspects of the Court's ruling would be affected by
switching from an exclusively forward-looking methodology to a
backward-looking approach.
First, the Court drew a sharp
distinction between appeals taken from district courts to circuit
courts, and appeals taken from circuit courts to the Supreme
Court.16 2 The two contexts differ, it explained, because a district
court ruling would not "clearly" establish a rule which officers
must obey in the future on pain of losing immunity.1 6 3 From a
backward-looking civil recourse perspective, however, the Court's
distinction is beside the point. If the plaintiff is entitled to
vindication of some kind for the violation that occurred in the
past, a finding by a district court produces "injury" to the
defendant just as surely as does a ruling by an appellate court.
The defendant would have standing to appeal not only from the
circuit court to the Supreme Court, but also from the district
court to the circuit court.

19 Id. at 2029.
160

Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A

Reply to Posner, Calabresi,Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 572
(2013).
161 See id.
12 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 & n.7.
13 Id. at 2033 n.7.
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Second, a vindication-oriented rationale would eliminate a
distinction the Court drew between the two officers. The Court
awarded standing to Camreta, who was still an officer and who
thus would be constrained in the future by the Ninth Circuit's
ruling on the Fourth Amendment claim.16 4 Taking a forwardlooking view, however, it suggested that the case was moot as to
Deputy Sheriff Alford, who "no longer works for Deschutes
County or in law enforcement" ' and thus has "lost his interest
in the Fourth Amendment ruling." '
From the perspective of
vindication, both defendants would have standing to appeal, for
Alford surely has not "lost his interest" in obtaining review of a
ruling that condemned him for abridging the highest law of the
land. From this perspective, Alford's interest is exactly the same
as Camreta's as he seeks to overturn the merits ruling of the
lower court.
IV. NOMINAL DAMAGES DESPITE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Official immunity simply cannot be squared with
compensation, and official immunity seems to be a firmly settled
principle. There seems to be no inclination on the part of any
member of the Court to question the basic doctrine on immunity.
But separating vindication from compensation offers possibilities
for compromise. If I am correct that vindication is the ultimate
goal and compensation is a means for achieving it, it follows that
other means may suffice, if only imperfectly, to further the
vindication goal. The way is open to accomplish significant
vindication of rights without radically transforming current
official immunity doctrine. The two values-vindication of rights
and shielding officials from monetary liability-can both be
accommodated by awarding nominal damages to plaintiffs who
prevail on the merits of their constitutional claims but are denied
compensation on account of official immunity.
Under my
proposal, such plaintiffs would be eligible for attorney fee
awards, but this would hardly undermine official immunity.
Current doctrine grants no immunity from prospective relief,
except for legislators, yet plaintiffs who obtain injunctions and
declaratory judgments are routinely awarded attorney fees.
164 Id. at 2029.
1"' Id. at 2034 n.9 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
67 (1997)).
166 Id.
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Nominal Damages as Vindication

Richard Fallon identifies in the case law a theme he calls the
"Equilibration Thesis," which posits that constitutional rights,
remedies, and immunities are "flexible and potentially adjustable
components of a package of rights and enforcement mechanisms
that should be viewed, and assessed for desirability, as a
whole. 1 7 Fallon focuses on official immunity, a defendantfriendly doctrine, yet one that serves the socially constructive
goal of avoiding over-deterrence of beneficial official conduct."'
Immunity is "a potential mechanism for achieving the best
overall bundle of rights and correspondingly calibrated remedies
within our constitutional system." ' 9
The doctrine is wellentrenched, enjoys broad support on the current Court, and will
not disappear. But it need not stand in the way of some measure
of vindication. The key to proper application of the Equilibration
Thesis is to identify all of the values that courts should strive to
keep in equilibrium, and give each its due. Thus, the other side
of the equation also requires attention. One value on the
plaintiffs side, much in evidence in Camreta and Pearson, is
deterrence. But it is not the only one. Vindication, too, is a value
that should weigh in the balance.
Let us stipulate that the immunity doctrine forecloses
compensatory damages in the cases to which it applies. The
Court should clarify the means and end relation between
compensation and vindication.
It should recognize that
vindication is the goal and compensation is just a tool for
achieving that goal. Taking vindication as the ultimate goal
invites the consideration of other means by which the plaintiff
may obtain recourse, even in cases in which compensatory
damages are foreclosed by immunity. We have already seen two
ways in which vindication could be boosted: (1) by reaching the
constitutional issue first in order-of-battle cases, and (2) by
rejecting standing and mootness objections in cases like Camreta.
But these two reforms, standing alone, may well not suffice to
satisfy plaintiffs' demands for vindication. Both of them leave

167 Fallon, supra note 48, at 480.

l6S Id. at 479.
169 Id. at 480.
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open the question of what remedy may be available to a plaintiff
who cannot obtain compensatory damages on account of
immunity.
Another option would more fully realize civil recourse
principles without greatly disturbing the equilibrium between
rights and remedies. Current constitutional tort law should be
modified so as to allow an award of nominal damages of $1 to
plaintiffs who prevail on the merits but lose only because of
immunity.7 0 Under civil recourse principles, the point of the
litigation is not "making the plaintiff whole," but "fair and
reasonable redress to the victim of a tortious wrong." ' Redress
may be accomplished by nominal damages.17 2 Applying this
principle to constitutional torts, the task is to reconcile the values
behind official immunity with the plaintiffs legitimate demand
for redress. Striking the appropriate balance could be achieved
by replacing the Court's all-or-nothing approach to damages with
a nominal damages compromise.
Three objections to this approach need to be addressed.
First, a skeptic may object that nominal damages are worthless,
or even insulting, to the plaintiff. But, there are good reasons to
170 This change would benefit many constitutional tort plaintiffs who can show
that their rights were violated, but not all of them. Some plaintiffs-notably, those
whose constitutional rights are violated in the course of the criminal process, leading
to their convictions-may still be denied vindication by the doctrine of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck holds:
[J]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Heck reflects "a strong judicial policy against the
creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction," and reluctance to "permit a convicted criminal defendant to proceed
with a malicious prosecution claim would permit a collateral attack on the conviction
through the vehicle of a civil suit." Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Arguably, these policies are strong enough to foreclose even nominal damages.
171 Goldberg & Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi,
Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, supra note 160, at 574.
172 Id. A declaratory judgment may also suffice. The potential problem with that
alternative is that declaratory relief is traditionally conceived as an alternative to an
injunction. In constitutional tort cases, the wrong is entirely in the past and
ordinarily is unlikely to recur. In these circumstances, declaratory relief may be seen
as inappropriate. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106
(1998) (denying plaintiffs request for declaratory relief for a past wrong).
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resist this objection. For one thing, the issue is not nominal
damages versus more substantial damages. The consensus on
the Court in favor of immunity means that the issue is nominal
damages versus nothing. In addition, the constitutional tort
damages rules do not favor large recoveries in any event.
Plaintiffs recover only damages they can prove and cannot obtain
damages for "the abstract value of a constitutional right. 1 73 The
circumstances of many constitutional tort suits suggest that
plaintiffs are motivated by a desire for judicial recognition that
the officer committed a constitutional wrong. 174 In these cases,
nominal damages can serve "the expressive function of law-the
function of law in 'making statements' as opposed to controlling
behavior directly. 1 7 To some extent, this aim can be met by
judicial statements that the plaintiffs rights were violated. But
in a civil recourse regime, nominal damages serve another, more
subtle goal: The award compels the17wrongdoer to do something,
however small, to redress the wrong. 1
The second objection is that nominal damages are already
available in certain cases. In Carey, the Court authorized the
award of nominal damages to plaintiffs who won on the
constitutional merits but could not prove compensatory
damages.1 77 But, in Carey the Court misunderstood the role of
nominal damages, just as it misunderstood the relation between
compensation and vindication.
The Court stressed society's
interest in enforcing constitutional rights.1 7 ' The aim of nominal
damages, the Court said, was to "recognize[] the importance to
organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed. 1 79
On the contrary, an award of nominal damages is, first and
foremost, a means of providing redress to the plaintiff.8 °
173 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
174 See supra note 82.
17 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.

2021, 2024 (1996).
17 See supra note 85.
177 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).

Id.
Id.
'so For another, quite different argument in favor of nominal damages in such

178
179

cases, see James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma:
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601 (2011).

Nothing in this Article takes issue with Pfander's basic thesis, yet there are
differences between the two approaches. While Professor Pfander approves Carey's

holding that an award of nominal damages vindicates the plaintiffs rights, id. at
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Operating under Carey's dubious premise that vindication and
compensation are more or less the same thing, the Court has not
had occasion to consider a vindication-oriented nominal damages
approach.
A third objection is that the policy behind official immunity
from compensatory damages may also be threatened by nominal
damages awards. According to Harlow, those aims are not only
to shield officials from paying damages, but also to spare them
such burdens as "the expenses of litigation, [and] the diversion of
'
official energy from pressing public issues."181
Those burdens are
present in suits for nominal damages too, even if the monetary
stakes are not as high. The answer to this objection is that it
depends on a value judgment that the Court has squarely
rejected. Outside the compensatory damages context, almost all
officials are already obliged to put up with the costs of being
subjected to litigation challenging the constitutional validity of
their official acts. Apart from legislators, officials have no
immunity against suits for prospective relief.18 2 The Court's
policy judgment is that-compensatory damages aside-the
value of providing access to the courts to vindicate rights
overrides the value of shielding officials from the burdens of
litigation."13

1606, 1608, 1620, his primary focus is on the forward-looking deterrence-based goal

of working out the content of constitutional rights in a post-Pearson world, id.at
1611-18. Thus, "[t]he whole point of the litigation would be to clarify the
constitutional norm in a world of uncertainty." Id. at 1619. Furthermore, "[s]uch an
[approach] could contribute much to the clarity and flexibility of constitutional tort
litigation." Id. at 1608. With guidance in mind, Pfander makes a cogent argument
that the policy of avoiding overdeterrence is comparatively weak when the plaintiff
seeks only nominal damages.

Professor Pfander looks mainly to the future, while my rationale for nominal
damages looks to the past. In addition, a practical difference between Professor
Pfander's forward-looking approach and the vindication-oriented, backward-looking

approach is that Pfander would limit this type of recovery to plaintiffs who
"expressly declar[e] in the complaint that they do not intend to seek and will not
accept any compensatory or punitive damages or an award of costs and attorney's

fees." Id. at 1607. By contrast, I argue in Part IV.C that the civil recourse approach
favors fee awards in cases brought to vindicate rights, whether or not the plaintiff
recovers anything more than nominal damages.
...Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
112 The only officers who may assert immunity from prospective relief are those
engaged in legislative functions. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the

U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32 (1980); see J. JEFFRIES ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS 59-60 (Found. Press 3d ed. 2013).
...See Pfander, supra note 180, at 1625.
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Bridging the Gap Between Prospective and Retrospective
Relief

Under current official immunity doctrine, forward-looking
constitutional remedies-injunctive and declaratory relief-are
often more readily available than backward-looking relief in the
form of compensatory damages. In the context of prospective
relief, constitutional rights are regarded as inherently valuable.
In practice, vindication is a strong enough reason for forwardlooking relief without proof of harm other than the violation
8 4 Even when the issue is whether to grant
itself."
a preliminary
injunction pending resolution on the merits, plaintiffs alleging
First Amendment violations often obtain them, as they are
"entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm." '
When the issue is backward-looking relief, however, Carey's
confusion of means with ends endures and sometimes blocks
vindication of the plaintiffs rights.
Let us grant that
compensation should be denied. It does not follow that all forms
of vindication should be denied. The tort-like structure of suits
for backward-looking relief has evidently diverted the Court's
attention from a commonplace feature of prospective remedies.
In litigation contexts in which there is no compensatory damages
issue, the independent and free-standing value of vindication is
self-evident. Rights are vindicated every day by forward-looking
injunctive or declaratory relief. By treating compensation and
vindication as more or less the same thing, the Court has created
an artificial and unwarranted distinction between the

A litigant seeking an injunction is required to show "irreparable injury," but
in modern constitutional litigation, this is not a high hurdle. See Elrod v. Bums, 427
U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." (citing N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971))). Recent illustrations include Moss v.
Spartanburg County School District Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012)
("Feelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury,
particularly in the Establishment Clause context .... "), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 623
(2012), Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that

denial of access to the press to view even the preliminaries of an execution would be
irreparable injury), and Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 302-03 (4th Cir.

2011) ("[M]onetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the loss of First
Amendment freedoms.").
.S Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 357 (2d Cir. 2003);
see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 122
(1991). For a recent illustration, see Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v.
Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir. 2012).
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systematically ineffective backward-looking constitutional tort
remedy and the systematically effective forward-looking
injunctive or declaratory remedy.
Maintaining the means and end relation between
compensation and vindication, as is done in the civil recourse
regime, makes it apparent that vindication is the ultimate goal of
both prospective and retrospective relief.
The differences
between the forward-looking and backward-looking contexts fade,
and the parallels between prospective and retrospective relief
grow more pronounced. If constitutional violations carry with
them "a presumption of irreparable harm" in the forward-looking
injunction context, why should they not carry with them a
similar presumption in the backward-looking non-injunction
context? And if such a "presumption of irreparable harm" is
present, how can it not logically demand some form of
vindication? Nominal damages for retrospective relief serve the
same vindicatory goal as some suits for prospective relief, a
context in which no compensatory damages are awarded, yet
rights are vindicated and attorney fees are available.
Distinguishing compensation from vindication enables us to
conceive of prospective and retrospective remedies as two parts of
a unified scheme aimed primarily at vindicating constitutional
rights.18 Compensatory damages and immunity aside, the only
difference that remains is a fortuitous one-the moment in time
at which the constitutional violation takes place. In the case of
prospective relief, the constitutional violation is threatened or
ongoing, while in constitutional torts it is in the past and
completed. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,"8 7 for example, the
plaintiff had been choked by a police officer at a traffic stop. 88
His effort to obtain prospective relief was denied because he
could not show a sufficient likelihood that he would be choked
again."'
By contrast, the plaintiff stopped by the police in

.S Of course, the "basic and essential" remedy is raising rights defensively, as a
shield against criminal or civil liability. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A.
Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1391-95 (2007).

Since that remedy is constitutionally required, not many hard questions arise
concerning its availability. The main issues for the law of constitutional remedies
concern the prospective and retrospective remedies discussed in the text.
1s7 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
lSS Id. at 95.
is9 Id. at 111.
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Kolender v. Lawson19 ° had standing to seek prospective relief.1 9
The difference is that the Kolender plaintiff had been stopped
fifteen times and could show the necessary likelihood of a future
encounter with the police. 9 2
The plaintiffs interest in
vindication is the same in the two cases, except that the Kolender
plaintiffs rights were violated more often, giving his grievance a
quantitative but not a qualitative edge over that of Lyons. Yet,
the prospects for vindication are quite different for the two
plaintiffs. The Lyons plaintiff was obliged to overcome the
immunity defense in order to win any relief at all. 9 3 Even if he
could get over that hurdle, were the case to arise today, he may
be ineligible for attorney fees unless he could prove actual
damages. 9 4 In contrast, the Kolender plaintiff, upon winning on
the merits, could obtain an injunction without showing any
compensable damages, and attorney fees would be recoverable
because of the attainment of that relief.19
The remedial gap between Lyons and Kolender illustrates a
general theme. In Zamecnik v. Indian PrairieSchool District #
204,9' school officials violated students' free speech rights by
forbidding messages on t-shirts. 9 7 While an award of damages is
likely to be small and produce little if any deterrence in such a
case, a proper set of facts would produce a different outcome. In
Zamecnik, one of the students had graduated by the time the
case was decided, so that the only possible relief for that plaintiff
was an award of damages. 98 But another remained in school. 99
Adding this one detail entirely transformed the remedial
landscape. The student who remained could obtain prospective

190 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
191 Id. at 355 n.3.
192

Id.

193 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06.
194 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 107 (1992).
19' See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human

Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (explaining that under the statute a "prevailing party"
may obtain attorney fees, and a "prevailing party" is "one who has been awarded
some relief by the court"). The hard questions in this area concern such matters as
whether a preliminary injunction can support attorney fees, especially when the
plaintiffs "initial victory was ephemeral." Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007)
(denying attorney fees in the circumstances of that case).
196

636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011).

197 Id. at 881-82.
19S Id. at 875.
199

Id.
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injunctive relief against the First Amendment violation, 20 as
well as a full award of attorney fees. 21 Thus, students who can
show a continuing interest in speaking may fully vindicate their
rights without satisfying Carey's requirements.2 2 But students
who happen to have graduated are sent away with only nominal
damages.
Under current doctrine, it is not even clear that this latter
set of plaintiffs may obtain an award of attorney fees. This
seemingly ancillary attorney fees issue is actually one of great
practical importance, because the availability of a fee award may
be critical to enforcement of constitutional rights.
The
underlying point here is simply that "[i]n the real world, rights
are meaningful only when the cost of protecting them is lower
than the cost of attacking them. 2 3 Thus, the fee lowers the
plaintiffs costs of defending the plaintiffs rights while increasing
the defendant's costs in resisting their enforcement.
C. Attorney Fees
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
authorizes a court to award a "reasonable" attorney fee to a
"prevailing party" as part of the costs, in cases brought under

211 Id. That plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction, and would have been
entitled to a permanent one upon succeeding on the merits. See id. at 875, 882.
201 Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2012) (per curiam). The Court

remanded for a determination of whether there were any "special circumstances"
that would justify a lower award. Id. at 12; see Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551,
556-59 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding no such special circumstances).
202 The availability of prospective relief is bolstered by two other principles.
First, even if a particular dispute over rights is in the past, plaintiffs who have a
continuing interest in asserting their rights may do so by showing that the issue is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 15, at 190. In
Irish Lesbian & Gay Organizationv. Giuliani,for example, a group denied a parade
permit for St. Patrick's Day, 1995, was nonetheless authorized to seek prospective

relief for future parades by showing that its members had a continuing interest in
demonstrating and that a challenge to any particular parade would "evad[e] review"
on account of the time required to litigate any particular permit denial. 143 F.3d
638, 648 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, some cases can

be structured as class actions, with new plaintiffs always entering the class. The
advantage of framing the litigation in that way is this: Even when some plaintiffs'
claims become moot, others will have live claims, and prospective relief will be
available. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1980).
203 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights,
98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2012).
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§ 1983 and other civil rights statutes.2 °4 Congress sought to make
it more attractive to lawyers to take these cases in which
monetary awards are often small in any event.2 "°
The civil
recourse aim of empowering the plaintiff is reflected in the
Senate Report on the bill, which noted that "fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a
meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional
policies which these laws contain."20 6 In Farrarv. Hobby,2 °7 the
Court held that a plaintiff who receives nominal damages is a
prevailing party.20" The Court stressed that "the prevailing party
inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained."2 9
But it does not follow that the plaintiff who receives nominal
damages is always entitled to attorney fees. Farrarwent on to
hold that "[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally
'prevails' under § 1988 should receive no attorney's fees at all. 210
The reason behind the nominal award is the crucial factor:
"When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary
relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. '21' Farrar
was just such a case. Joseph Farrar had partly owned a school
for disturbed teenagers and Texas officials had shut it down.21 2
Farrar sued Hobby-then the lieutenant governor of Texas-and
other officials, seeking $17 million in damages.2 3 His theory was
that they had deprived him of liberty and property without due
process of law in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 2 4 The case was tried by a jury which found that Hobby
had violated Farrar's due process rights, but that "Hobby's
conduct was not 'a proximate cause of any damages' suffered by
Joseph Farrar. 2 15 On these facts, the Court ruled that Farrar
should not receive a fee, as he had not established the necessary
204
201

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
S.REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913,

1971 WL 14051.
201 Id. at 2.
207 506 U.S. 103 (1992).

Id.
Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
20s

209

215

Id.

at 112.
at 114.
at 115.
(citation omitted).
at 105-06.
at 106.
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causal link between the violation and his loss. 216 Lower courts
are divided on the question of whether attorney fees may be
awarded in cases in which the gap between what is asked for and
7
the nominal award received is not as great as in Farrar.2
How should the Farrarframework apply to the "nominal
damages despite immunity" fact pattern? On the one hand, the
plaintiff may be able to show that vindicating rights is a primary
rationale for the litigation. A plaintiff avoids the Farrarobstacle,
so long as the plaintiffs failure to obtain attorney fees is solely
due to immunity, not inability to show that the violation caused
damages. If these conditions are met, the case for attorney fees
is strong under civil recourse principles because fees bolster the
plaintiffs efforts to hold the wrongdoer accountable.
A retort to this reasoning is that the "nominal damages
despite immunity" case presents a factor that is not present in
Farraror the lower court cases that apply it. The new factor is
that the defendant is immune from liability for damages. For
this reason, the case presented under my nominal damages
proposal is unlike Farrar and other nominal damages cases
adjudicated under the current "no distinction between defendant
victory on the merits and defendant victory on immunity"
doctrine. The difference is not merely a factual one, for this type
of case would implicate the policy of avoiding unwanted
deterrence of official action. In order to hold that attorney fees
may be awarded, the Supreme Court would have to curb the
impact of official immunity to the extent the issue is not
compensatory damages, but just attorney fees. It would have to
decide not only that the plaintiff has a strong claim to them, but
also that, on the attorney fees issue, the civil recourse value of
empowering the plaintiff outranks the immunity policy.
This objection is not as strong as it may at first appear, for it
ignores the doctrine on prospective relief. The point here is not
just that, legislators aside, officials are subject to prospective
relief, but also that attorney fees are routinely available for
prospective relief. That is, the Court distinguishes between
money paid as damages and money paid as attorney fees,
allowing recovery of the latter in prospective relief cases while
216

Id. at 115-16.

See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 8, at 709-10; see also Gray ex rel. Alexander
v. Bostic, 720 F.3d 887, 894 (2013) (holding no fee where plaintiff sought $25,000
and received nominal damages).
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denying recovery of the former in official immunity cases.
Lefemine v. Wideman21 is illustrative. The plaintiff and other
members of Columbia Christians for Life ("CCL") told the sheriff
that they planned to hold a demonstration against abortion at a
busy intersection.21 9
The sheriff responded that if they
proceeded, they would be arrested, as they had been at a similar
demonstration several years earlier.220 Lefemine sued the sheriff
under § 1983, asserting a First Amendment violation and seeking
"nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, a permanent
injunction, and attorney's fees."22 The District Court granted a
permanent injunction against content-based restrictions on
CCL's speech.2 22 Following the rule this Article challenges, the
court denied nominal damages on account of official immunity.22 3
It also denied the request for attorney fees.22 4 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of attorney fees, reasoning that Lefemine was
not a "prevailing party," as the injunction did not "alte[r] the
22
relative positions of the parties.""
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.22 6
Lefemine was a prevailing party because he "desired to conduct
demonstrations ... with signs that the defendant police officers

had told him he could not carry. He brought this suit in part to
secure an injunction to protect himself from the defendants'
standing threat of sanctions. And he succeeded in removing that
threat.227
Moreover, absent as yet unidentified "special
circumstances," he should receive a fee.228
Underlying the Court's distinction between retrospective and
prospective relief-granting official immunity for the former but
not the latter-is a policy judgment concerning the proper
balance between avoiding unwanted deterrence, on the one hand,
218

133 S. Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam).

219
220

Id. at 10.
Id.

221

Id.

(citing LeFemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620 (D.S.C. 2010), affd

sub nom. Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 9
(2012) (per curiam)).
222
223
224

225
226
227

221

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12. On remand, the Fourth Circuit panel found no special

circumstances. See Lefemine v. Wideman, 758 F.3d 551, 556-59 (4th Cir. 2014).
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and the plaintiffs interest in a remedy on the other. That
judgment, only partially articulated in the opinions but implicit
in their outcomes, is that the defendant's interest is too strong,
and plaintiffs interest is too weak, to justify compensatory
damages.22 9 In the prospective relief context, however, the
balance tips in favor of relief. As a corollary, the rule that
attorney fees are available in prospective relief cases must be
based on a policy judgment that awarding a fee does not unduly
deter the official either.
Now consider the nominal damages context. The impact of
nominal damages is quite similar, if not identical, to that of
prospective relief. In both cases the official is not required to pay
compensatory damages, yet the official's conduct is constrained
going forward by the ruling on the merits. There is a difference
between the two. In an injunction case, the constraint is the
prospect of being held in contempt if the official violates it. In a
nominal damages case, the constraint is the one the Court
identified in its ruling on the defendant's standing to appeal in
Camreta v. Greene23 °--the prospect of liability for compensatory
damages once the law is clear and official immunity is no longer
a hurdle for the plaintiff.2 1
That difference aside, the two
contexts are alike. On the issue of whether an attorney fee
award would unduly deter the official, there is no difference
between the two non-compensatory remedies.
The Court
implicitly holds in Lefemine that an award does not overly deter
in the context of prospective relief.23 2 The same judgment seems
to follow for the nominal damages context.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIVENS DOCTRINE AND ALTERNATIVE

REMEDIES

Besides challenging the Court's treatment of remedial,
"order-of-battle," standing, and justiciability issues in official
immunity
cases,
a
vindication-oriented
approach
to
constitutional torts has implications for other aspects of
constitutional tort doctrine as well. In particular, it provides
grounds for questioning the notion that the availability of state
229

The Court explicitly balances interests in this way in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
230 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
231 Id. at 2030-31.
232

Lefemine, 133 S. Ct. at 11.
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remedies can preclude constitutional tort liability, a theme that
appears with increasing frequency in the Court's doctrine on
implied remedies for constitutional violations by federal officers.
Minneci v. Pollard33 concerned an effort by Pollard, an
inmate at a privately-run federal prison in California, to obtain
damages from employees for violations of his Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment.2 34 Claiming that he
had been denied necessary medical attention, Pollard sought
relief under the implied cause of action for constitutional
violations recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 3' a case in which the Court held
that the target of a search by federal officers could sue them for
violating his Fourth Amendment rights despite the absence of a
federal statute authorizing the suit.2 3 Bivens established that a
cause of action for damages could be implied directly from the
Constitution.2 3 7 The broad issue in Bivens cases is one of
separation of powers-whether the federal courts can and should
authorize remedies for violations of federal law under their
power to make federal common law, or whether the creation of
such remedies should be left up to Congress.2 38 In the context of
remedies for violations of federal statutes, the Court has severely
restricted judicially-crafted damage remedies.23 9
In the
constitutional context, the Court has, ever since the 1980s,
steadily retreated from Bivens,24 ° without quite abandoning the
basic principle.2 4 1 The aspect of that retrenchment that concerns
233

132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). For a thorough discussion of this case and its

implications, see T. Ward Frampton, Bivens's Revisions: Constitutional Torts After
Minneci v. Pollard, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1711 (2012).
234 Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 620.
235 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

23s

Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 397.

239

See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); see also FALLON ET

231
237

AL., supra note 15, at 705-08.

24 The lower courts have followed suit. For example, a recent D.C. Circuit case
holds that "military, national security, [and] intelligence" matters are special factors

weighing against recognizing a Bivens cause of action. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d
390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
241 See generally, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding

no Bivens remedy against a private prison corporation that operated a facility for
federal prisoners); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (holding no Bivens remedy

against a federal agency); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (holding no
Bivens remedy for injuries arising out of military service).
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us here is the Court's growing allegiance to the proposition that
the existence of an "alternative, existing" process will foreclose
the Bivens cause of action.2 42
A.

Alternative Remedies and the Bivens Doctrine

Given this context, observers expected that Richard Pollard
would lose his case if the Court were to follow the precedents.2 4 3
And he did.2 44 For present purposes, the importance of the case
lies in the reason why he lost-namely, that he had available to
him a California state law remedy. 24
A decade earlier, in
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,246 the availability of a
state law tort remedy had foreclosed Bivens for a prisoner suing a
private corporation operating a federal prison.2 47 Pollard tried to
distinguish his case on the ground that he was suing guards
employed by the private corporation and not the corporation
itself, but the Court found it "difficult to square Pollard's
argument with Malesko's reasoning. ' 248 Writing for the majority,
Justice Breyer explained that "Pollard's Eighth Amendment
claim focuses upon a kind of conduct that typically falls within
the scope of traditional state tort law,"249 which "provides an
alternative, existing process capable of protecting the
constitutional interests at stake. ' 2 ' According to the Court, both
compensation and deterrence were served by the state remedy,
because "[s]tate tort law ... can help to deter constitutional
violations as well as to provide compensation to a violation's
victim. '2 1 Pollard sought to head off this outcome by pointing out
that the state tort remedy, a California statute that authorized
suits for negligence against prison guards and other

242 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007); see also John F. Preis,
Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723 (2008)
(discussing this development and voicing objections to it).
243 See, e.g., Isabella Ruth Edmundson, Imprisoned by Liability: Why Bivens
Suits Should Not Be Available Against Employees of Privately Run Federal Prisons,
45 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2011).
244 Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012).
245 Id.
246 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
247

Id. at 71-73.

24s

Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 624.

249

Id. at 623.

250

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

251

Id. at 624.
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custodians,"' was less effective than a Bivens remedy because
state law could and did limit the amount of recoverable damages.
For example, California law caps recoveries for emotional
distress.21 3 But the Court ruled that "[s]tate-law remedies and
a
25 4 All
potential Bivens remedy need not be perfectly congruent."
that is needed is that they provide "roughly similar incentives"
and "roughly similar compensation. 2
A vindication-oriented approach would radically alter the
analysis of Minneci. The Court's premise is that the payment of
money for a violation of state tort law, when it happens to
coincide with damages for a constitutional violation, will both
compensate and deter the constitutional violation "roughly" as
well as a payment of money for the constitutional violation itself
in a Bivens suit.256 If the aims of constitutional tort were the
same as the aims of ordinary tort law, the Court would stand on
firm ground.25 7 But the vindication of constitutional rights brings
into play a distinct value. By pointing out that the state tort
remedy may "provide compensation to a violation's victim,"258 the
Court in Minneci may be trying to bring vindication into the
matrix of policies bearing on the implied cause of action issue.
Any such effort is doomed to fail. The reason why is simple:
Minneci reflects the Court's erroneous conflation of vindication
with compensation in Carey. Contrary to the teaching of that
case, compensation for injury is distinct from vindication of
rights. Suppose a plaintiff receives compensation for an injury
through worker's compensation insurance, or as a result of the
application of a state law liability rule aimed at deterrence, or
even one aimed at vindicating state law tort rights. However
welcome the money may be, the award does nothing to provide
the injured person with an opportunity to vindicate federal
constitutional rights. The issue of whether or not plaintiffs
constitutionalrights were violated is not at issue in the state tort
See id. at 625.
See id. (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1997) and other state
law provisions that limit damages).
252

253

256

Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)).
Id.
Id.

257

For discussion of the impact of Minneci on the "non-vindication" goals of

254
255

compensation and deterrence, see Alexander Volokh, The Modest Effect of Minneci v.
Pollard on Inmate Litigants, 46 AKRON L. REV. 287 (2013).
25s Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 624.
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case. For that reason alone, it is not possible for state tort law
damages to provide recourse for the constitutional wrong any
more than worker's compensation can do.
As the Court
recognized in Bivens, state tort law and the Bill of Rights protect
different interests, even if the same set of facts can give rise to
both kinds of claims.25 9
A civil recourse approach to constitutional torts calls into
question not only Minneci but a long line of predecessor cases
going back to Bush v. Lucas,26 ° in which the availability of an
alternative remedy foreclosed a Bivens suit. 2 1 In Bush, as well
as in Schweiker v. Chilicky,26 2 alternative remedies were
available under federal administrative law, rather than state tort
law. 2 " But this difference is functionally insignificant. In Bush,
a federal employee sought a Bivens remedy for a First
Amendment violation. 2 4
The Court pointed to alternative
remedies made available by the civil service regime governing
federal employees.2 5
Chilicky concerned a claim by social
security recipients that officials had deprived them of their Fifth
Amendment due process rights. 26" A remedy was available under
the federal social security statutes.2 7 In each of these cases,
however, the remedy was for statutory violations. Civil recourse
demands a remedy for the constitutionalviolations.2 8
Put simply, an alternative remedy satisfies civil recourse
requirements only if it allows the plaintiff to vindicate the
plaintiffs constitutional rights. For example, a state court suit in
29 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 394 (1971). In Bivens, the specific right at issue was the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 391-92. The Court has recognized the gap between the protection afforded by
ordinary tort rights and by constitutional rights in the Eighth Amendment context
as well. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see, e.g., McCaster v. Clausen,
684 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2012).
260 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
261

Id. at 390.

262

487 U.S. 412 (1988).

263
264

See id. at 428-29; Bush, 462 U.S. at 385.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.

Id. at 381-82, 385-88.
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 414.
267 Id. at 424.
261
266

26s Whether constitutional tort recovery ought to be denied for reasons other
than the availability of another remedy is a separate issue. See Wilkie v. Robbins,
551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (holding that, whether or not there were alternative
remedies, other factors may justify denying a Bivens remedy). In any event, the
Bivens remedy is probably not constitutionally required. See FALLON ET AL., supra
note 15, at 740-41.
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which Pollard could sue the private prison guards for
constitutional violations would satisfy civil recourse, even though
an ordinary state tort remedy would not.26 9 The distinction
between regimes that satisfy vindication and those that do not
can be a subtle one, and-when this distinction is recognizedsuperficially similar cases can produce very different results. In
Chilicky, the social security laws gave plaintiff a remedy only for
money wrongfully withheld under the statute.2 70 No finding of
unconstitutionality was required, and there is no plausible sense
in which the remedy could be viewed as a means of vindicating
constitutional rights, nor did the Court suggest otherwise. Bush
is a trickier case. There, the employee was entitled to raise a
constitutional claim in the civil service proceeding as grounds for
finding a statutory violation.2 71 Thus, a finding by the judge of a
constitutional violation could prove decisive in the plaintiffs
favor.2 72 Nothing in the reasoning of Bush, however, suggests
that this statutory incorporation of constitutional law was
decisive, or even important.2 73 In short, Bush-like Chilicky2 74
focused on compensating for the underlying statutory 2injury.
7
rights.
constitutional
one's
It did not focus on vindicating
B. Alternative Remedies for ConstitutionalViolations by State
Officials
In Minneci, the plaintiff tried to bring a Bivens implied cause
of action against defendants who acted under color of federal
law.2 76 The ruling has no direct application to suits brought
under § 1983, in which plaintiffs seek relief on constitutional
26 Cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (stating that state courts
may not decline jurisdiction over § 1983 cases absent a "valid excuse" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Of course, § 1983 was not available to Pollard, as it only
applies to defendants acting under color of state law and Pollard was a federal

prisoner. See id. at 731.
270 Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427.
271 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1983).
272 See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims,
75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1147-49 (1989) (discussing grounds on which the Court in

Chilicky could have, but chose not to, distinguish Bush).
273 In Chilicky, the Court pointed out that "[t]he Bush opinion, however, drew no
distinction between compensation for a 'constitutional wrong' and the restoration of
statutory rights that had been unconstitutionally taken away." 487 U.S. at 427.
274 Bush, 462 U.S. at 388.
275

Id.

276

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012).
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grounds against officers acting under color of state law. But
make no mistake-the Court's reliance on state remedies, and
the civil recourse critique of its reasoning, have implications for
§ 1983 litigation as well. Seeing why requires a recognition that
the relation of state remedies to federal causes of action has a
long and checkered history. In Monroe v. Pape,77 the Court held
that the actions of the Chicago police in searching the plaintiffs
house were actionable under § 1983 despite the availability of a
parallel state law tort remedy. 28 Later, the Court applied this
same rule to state administrative as well as judicial
proceedings.279
Other cases, however, have given greater weight to the
availability of state remedies. There are three examples of this.
First, citing an unwillingness to turn § 1983 into "a font of tort
law," Paul v. Davis2 ° declined to allow § 1983 suits for
defamation, and remitted plaintiffs to their state remedies.2 1
Second, in defining the content of the Due Process Clause,
Zinermon v. Burch21 2 carved out a role for state remedies, though
in a rather different context.28 3 Ordinarily the state is obliged to
provide a person with due process before deprivation of liberty or
property. Zinermon held that even after the deprivation has
occurred, state law may provide the process that is due for
deprivation of liberty or property, provided a pre-deprivation
hearing is impracticable. 2 4 Third, Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,2 5 illustrates yet
another variant on the state remedies theme. There, the § 1983
plaintiff sued for a regulatory taking on account of the Planning
277
27s

365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Id. at 183; see Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and

the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277, 295-96 (1965).
279 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); see, e.g., Bowlby v. City of
Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying this principle).
2s0 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
2s1

Id. at 701.

2s2

494 U.S. 113 (1990); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (a

pre-Zinermon holding to similar effect); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 690

(1977) (stating that state tort remedies provide procedural due process to students
seeking a remedy for corporal punishment).
2s3 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (a pre-Zinermon holding to

similar effect); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 690 (1977) (stating that state tort
remedies provide procedural due process to students seeking a remedy for corporal

punishment).
2s4 494 U.S. at 125-26.
2s85 473

U.S. 172 (1985).
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Commission's restrictions on its uses of property."' The Court,
however, ruled that the suit would not be ripe until Hamilton
Bank had pursued state remedies.2 8 7
No general principle links together all of these references to
state remedies. The reasons for directing plaintiffs to pursue
state remedies, or declining to do so, vary from case to case and
need not be canvassed here. From the perspective of vindication
and civil recourse, however, a guiding principle emerges. If
vindication of constitutional rights were the sole value
controlling "state remedies" issues, the key question in all of
these cases would be whether a given state remedy authorizes
the plaintiff to sue for a constitutional violation. Despite Monroe,
a state that provided access to its courts for constitutional claims,
as all states are presumptively required to do,2"8 would meet civil
recourse requirements, so long as state courts gave due regard to
constitutional guarantees.8 9
Many of the Court's rulings favoring state courts would
probably meet this test, but not all of them do. The ruling in
Paul, for example, can be understood in either of two ways,
neither of them attractive. First, the Court may have meant to
say that there is no constitutionally protected interest in
reputation, no matter how malicious the defendant's
statements,2 9 ° so there would be no occasion for civil recourse in
any constitutionally-based defamation case. But this reading of
the opinion is undermined by Paul itself, in which the Court
ruled that the Due Process Clause did give constitutional
protection to a plaintiff who could show that the stigma was
accompanied by some other state-imposed burden. Thus, the
Court in Paul distinguished between the plaintiffs allegation
that he had been falsely identified as a shoplifter from an earlier

2S Id. at 175.
2s7 Id. at 186;

see, e.g., Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st
Cir. 2012) (applying this principle).
2" Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734-35 (2009).
2S9For the classic expression of the argument that the federal courts should be
favored because state courts are not sufficiently sympathetic to constitutional
claims, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06,
1115-16, 1120-21 (1977).
29 In Siegert v. Gilley, the Court declined to distinguish a case in which the
plaintiff alleged facts similar to these. 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991).
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case which accorded due process rights to a plaintiff who was not
only stigmatized by being identified as a drunk but also lost the
right to purchase liquor.29 1
Second, the Court may have intended to treat state tort law
as a surrogate for a constitutional claim. Such a ruling would be
squarely at odds with the civil recourse norm. To the extent
Minneci means that plaintiffs with constitutional claims must
pursue state tort remedies instead of the federal Bivens remedy,
Minneci is a contemporary version of this second interpretation
of Paul. Perhaps it could still be distinguished from Paul, but
only because of the separation of powers concern that inheres in
Bivens litigation on account of the lack of congressional
authorization, a factor that is not present in § 1983 cases.
CONCLUSION

Recent Supreme Court constitutional tort cases have made it
harder than ever for plaintiffs to recover damages for
constitutional violations.
Connick v. Thompson 292 barred
recovery to a man who, on account of prosecutorial misconduct,
had been convicted of a crime he did not commit and spent many
years on death row. 293 Ashcroft v. Iqba1294 limited the liability 29
of
29
supervisors for acts of their subordinates. ' Rehberg v. Paulk 1
applied the absolute immunity of witnesses to include grand jury
witnesses. 297
Filarsky v. Delia298 broadened the immunity
available to officials to include a private attorney working part
time on an official investigation.2 9 9 One reason for the lack of
success of the plaintiffs side may well be that a majority of the
Justices on the current Court hold restrictive views of
constitutional protections and therefore tend to resist expanding
the scope of individual constitutional rights. But that cannot be
291 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (distinguishing Wisconsin v.

Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)).
292 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
293 Id. at 1358-60, 1365. The prosecutors could not be sued on account of
absolute prosecutorial immunity, and the city could not be sued because the

evidence of failure to properly train the errant prosecutors was insufficient to show

an "official policy." Id. at 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
294

556 U.S. 662 (2009).

291

Id. at 677.

296

132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012).

297

Id. at 1510.

29S

132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012).

299

Id. at 1667-68.
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the whole explanation, for many recent cases that cabined access
to damages relief were decided by large majorities that included
the so-called "liberal" Justices. °°
Part of the blame for the decline of constitutional tort law
emanates from the original sin committed in Carey, when
another unanimous Court 301 blurred the distinction between
compensation and vindication. The Court's failure to appreciate,
or at least articulate, the means and end relation between
compensation and vindication led to the devaluation of
vindication and, especially in later cases, the glorification of
deterrence as the core rationale for constitutional tort liability.
Putting so much weight on deterrence poses grave danger to the
future of constitutional tort law. Efforts at deterrence may be
ineffectual on account of official immunity and other limiting
doctrines.3 0 2 For that reason, the Justices may have come to
believe that comparatively little is at stake for the plaintiff in
any event. If that is so, then extending immunity further, as was
done in Rehberg and Filarsky, or narrowing the scope of
municipal liability, as was done in Connick, or further restricting
the Bivens remedy, as was done in Minneci, may appear to come
at little cost.

...For example, Rehberg, in which the Court extended absolute immunity to a
"complaining witness" in a grand jury proceeding, was a unanimous decision. 132 S.

Ct. at 1500, 1507. In Reichle v. Howards, five other Justices joined Justice Thomas's
majority opinion finding that Secret Service officers who arrested a protester did not
violate clearly established law, two Justices concurred in the judgment, and one did
not participate. 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2090, 2095, 2097 (2012). Chief Justice Roberts wrote

for a unanimous Court in Filarsky, holding that a private attorney hired to conduct
an internal affairs investigation was entitled to qualified immunity. 132 S. Ct. at
1659, 1667-68. There were two concurring opinions. Id. at 1668, 1669. By contrast,

the "official policy" issue does seem to divide the Court on ideological lines. Connick
v. Thompson was a 5-4 case, with Justice Ginsburg writing a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1353, 1370

(2011).
As for the cases discussed in this Article, there was no sharp ideological divide
between liberals and conservatives. Justice Ginsburg was the only dissenter in
Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012). The Justices disagreed among

themselves on several issues in Camreta and Pearson, but none of them took the
vindication-oriented approach advocated here.
301 Justice Marshall concurred in the result without writing an opinion and
Justice Blackmun did not participate. Carey v. Piphius, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978).

302 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 367-73, 378-87 (2000)

(discussing a variety of problems with deterrence theory as applied to constitutional
torts).
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There is a great problem presented by these cases: They
ignore the truth, and even the possibility, that the vindication of
personal rights is a worthy aim-an aim that is sufficiently
valuable and vibrant in and of itself to sustain a robust body of
constitutional tort law whether or not liability deters many
constitutional violations. It is time for the courts to redirect
attention to the value of vindication, to decouple it from
compensation, and to install it as an organizing norm in the field
of constitutional tort law.

